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China is a high-corruption country and the ruling Communist Party ("the Party") has made anti-corruption enforcement a top priority. China is also well known for her authoritarian decisiveness in policy making and her effectiveness in policy implementation with a centralized political control contrasting sharply with a decentralized economic policy. This chapter examines two key aspects of this formulation. First, how has the authoritarian characteristic affected China's anticorruption enforcement; and, second, how is China different from other countries, authoritarian or otherwise, in this regard? This chapter discusses China's anti-corruption enforcement within the context of the convergence/divergence debate and examines the degree to which the Chinese anti-corruption model converges or diverges from the prevailing "international best practice" that is commonly observed in the high income/low corruption countries. Specifically this chapter will also discuss whether China could develop an anti-corruption system that operates within a rule-based legal framework. The principal argument is that China's anti-corruption practice manifests certain core features that may be unique to the Chinese political context and those features show most strikingly at the height of an anti-corruption campaign. But if we look beyond an exceptional "strike-hard campaign" that targets the "tigers", shift the focus to the more routine enforcement against "flies", and, in particular, observe China's anti-corruption enforcement for a longer time span, it becomes clearer that China does not operate an anticorruption model sui generis. As the anti-corruption storm dies down (as it will naturally occur), the enforcement will become more routine, regularized, and institutional. When that happens, the Chinese anti-corruption model, if any, will appear no different from models elsewhere. ; postprint

Sapio, F., Trevaskes, S., Nesossi, E. & Biddulph, S (Eds.), ; A neglected aspect in the global promotion of rule of law is the political nature of the rule of law. While scholars and practitioners in the field have debated the necessity and feasibility of worldwide rule of law (McCubbins, Rodriguez and Weingast, 2010; Weingast, 2008), they tend to focus on whether, or the degree to which, a developing country meets the "doorstep conditions" for the rule of law as defined in the West. The literature in general marginalizes the political use of law when it is applied in the developing world. In a sense, law is purposively regarded as a technical governance tool, and the politics of rule of law is intentionally taken out of the equation in academic and policy considerations. This chapter uses labor dispute resolution in China as an example to study access to justice in China's social and economic transition. The principal argument is that the legal approach to access to justice, with a sharp focus on law and courts, is narrow and fails to explain the wider political horizon on which justice is defined and redefined according to the prevailing sense of justice and the political economy that shapes it. In doing so, this chapter brings politics back to the over-legalized concept of access to justice. The chapter first explores the background in which legal justice emerges in China, and then examines the dominant features of access to justice as it is understood and implemented in China. ; published_or_final_version

Since the late 1970s, the Chinese judiciary has undergone a continuous reform process of professionalization and institutionalization. Despite the political constraints, there are sufficient opportunities and incentives to continue China's judicial reform so as to enhance judicial capacity and rebuild trust and credibility. It is undeniable that the Chinese judiciary has been improving itself noticeably through enhancing professionalism, institutionalization and autonomy. Judicial reform is possible because China's authoritarian system demands for a degree of the rule of law. First, rule of law legitimizes political powers and generations of party and, without exceptions, state leaders in the reform China have invariably embraced the concept of rule of law at certain stage of terms. Second, the central government may rely on the rule of law and an effective court in particular to rein in local governments. Third, the rule of law may have proved to be the most effective mechanism for dispute resolution in the long run. The primary function of the court from this perspective is to offer efficient dispute resolution for the vast majority of individual cases. To be effective for an institution that is politically weak, the judiciary must develop a sufficient degree of credibility that it is autonomous from political and social influences, neutral to the parties before it, and fair in applying rules. China is likely to develop a judiciary that is politically submissive, but professionally capable in offering effective and fair legal solution to disputes. ; preprint

A state achieves legitimacy through multiple sources, one of which is the effectiveness of its governance. Generations of scholars since Hobbes have identified the maintenance of peace and order as core functions of a legitimate state. In the modern world, economic prosperity, social stability and effective control of corruption often provide adequate compensation for a deficit of democracy. Corruption closely correlates with legitimacy. While a perceived pervasive, endemic corruption undermines the legitimacy of a regime, a successful anti-corruption campaign can allow a regime to recover from a crisis of legitimacy (Gilley 2009; Seligson and Booth 2009). This is the rationale behind the periodical campaigns against corruption that have been conducted by the Chinese Communist Party ('Party' or 'CCP') (Manion 2004; Wedeman 2012). Political leaders in China have found it expedient to use anti-corruption campaigns to remove their political foes, to rein in the bureaucracy and to restore public confidence in their ability to rule. Through anti-corruption campaigns, emerging political leaders consolidate their political power, secure loyalty from political factions and regional political forces, and enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of the general public. In an authoritarian state that experiences a high level of corruption, an anti-corruption campaign is a delicate political battle that addresses two significant concerns. The first concern is to orchestrate the campaign so that it is regime-reinforcing instead of regime-undermining. To remain credible, the regime must demonstrate its willingness and capacity to punish corrupt officials at the highest levels. ; preprint

Both China's political and constitutional systems demand a compliant and subservient judiciary. Politically, the court is a marginal institution in China's political system and the Party controls the judiciary effectively through the Political-Legal Committee. But political control and a resulting judicial compliance and subservience are not the only story of the past 30 years in China. The political and economic changes in China have generated demands for the rule of law to supply political legitimacy, promote economic development and improve social governance. Within the Party, there has been a reformist tradition which advocates a functional separation between the Party and the legal institutions, an enhanced role of law and an expansive institutional autonomy of the courts. The relationship between the Party and the court is thus a dynamic one. While the Party has the absolute power, it has to refrain itself from intruding into the daily operation of the court and leave judges alone to handle the business of judging. The Party has its own objectives and repeatedly reminds the court of keeping the Party's interest the priority in adjudication, but judges have to follow legal rules, procedures and their own professional standard in handling individual cases. ; postprint

Having experienced a painful process of transition from revolution to modernization over the past 60 years, China now faces the mounting social, economic and political challenges that regularly face transition states. While the Chinese Communist Party-state proves to be resilient and able to adapt, innovate and evolve, it is also well-known that the social and economic transitions in China have produced significant strains on the political system. How does the Chinese state differ from the liberal democracies discussed in this volume in managing social and political risks? This paper examines the evolving strategies of political control in China. It points out the increasingly politicized challenges that the Chinese Communist Party faces and also offers an explanation for the reasons behind the politicization or the mainstreaming of politically motivated challenges. The paper then introduces the paradigmatic shift in the Party's control strategy from open political repression to an apolitical, less ideological social management in regulating the increasingly politicized challenges. ; postprint

This paper is a modest attempt to study legal pluralism in rural China using rural legal services as a case study. The paper examines three factors that are driving and constraining the development of rural legal services delivery in China: geographic limitation, professional interest and political intervention. First of all, geography matters and rurality creates natural barriers for rural residents in limiting the access to legal services. There is an inherent spatial inequality for rural population when it comes to the distribution of legal service and the geographic isolation and remoteness nurture a particular type of legal culture among rural residents. Second, professionalism matters. There are strong ideological and economic forces which pull the rural legal service providers away from their grass-roots. The calling of an emerging legal professionalism (and the related financial incentives) demands a certain degree of legal knowledge and qualification, rules of procedures, code of conduct and regularity in legal practice. In order to survive in an increasingly competitive legal market, rural legal service providers have to run legal practices as a business, considering the "bottom line" and following the logic of a legal market. Finally, politics matters. To overcome geographic barriers and correct market failure, the government would need to steps-in to provide or supplement legal service in rural areas by introducing a public dimension of legal services. Politics may ameliorate where the legal service market fails. ; postprint

Book Review: The Politics of Cross-Border Crime in Greater China: Case Studies of Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao, by Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo. Armonk, NY, and London: ME Sharpe, 2009 ; published_or_final_version

Book Reviews ; The book is a timely call for a more cautious and restrictive use of Death Penalty in China. But what matters most at the moment, it seems, is not to educate the general public, or to tighten the procedural rules, but to challenge the mentality of the Party/state: excessive use of Death Penalty does not deter crime and does not stabilize society. Instead, it undermines the legitimacy of legal institutions and erodes trust in the political system. ; published_or_final_version

Hong Kong is clearly within the 'One Country' and this is simply no longer an issue. How the 'Two Systems' can survive, and how they should interact, is the riding question. The substance of mutual legal assistance in general, and extradition — or rendition — in particular, in a domestic context is not necessarily different from that in an international context. Such assistance will be the subject of an agreement between two jurisdictions arrived at through a process of negotiation and agreed upon by both parties. There is no inherent substance in any extradition agreement, international or otherwise. The substance is negotiable depending upon necessity and the parties' political will and political skill. No one party should impose its will on the other. The only question is what are the terms that should go into a rendition agreement between Hong Kong and the Mainland? ; published_or_final_version

Criminal procedure in China had been governed by the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 1979). This was amended in 1996 (the Amendment). In many aspects, the Amendment introduces important changes to the previous procedures and significantly redistributes the existing division of powers within the criminal justice system. It restricts police power and the prosecution's discretion. It enhances the position of the court and differentiates the role of judges. It also offers more protection for the rights of the accused and enhances the position of defence lawyers in the criminal process in substantive and procedural aspects. Consequently criminal lawyers are expected to play a more active and meaningful role in criminal defence.